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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHAHD NOLAN JARDINE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

BRUNS\VICK CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant,

I\

, Case No.
10631

~

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Respondent begs the Court's indulgence in restating the nature of the case, differing from Appellant's
statement.

S'l'ATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought action for damages suffered by
him in reliance on the defendant's negligent and reckless represenations concerning a builder with whom
plaintiff contracted for the construction of bowling
lanes.

1

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Although Appellant correctly states the rule that
upon defendant's motion to dismiss the Court must
view the facts most favorable to the plaintiff (Hespondent) the Appellant then proceeds to state the facts
with an interpretation favorable to the defendant and
unfavorable to the plaintiff. Hcspondent therefore restates the facts more fully than did the Appellant.
The plaintiff, Richard Nolan .T ardine, was born
at Taylorsville, Idaho, aud was 54 years old at the time
of the trial. He had an eighth grade education, worked
first in a spud warehouse in Idaho Falls, Idaho, which
was seasonal. He got married, moved to Butte, l\Iontana, and "started to hauling mining props into the
mine there" which he did for fhe or six years (H. 120).
He had lived in Salt Lake for five years, having come
here in 1959 from l\1oses Lake, 'V ashington ( R. 119) .
In Butte, Montana, he had his own truck, one helper
and worked on a contract basis. He went from llutte
to Mossy Rock, 'Vashington where he set up a sawmill
and manufactured railroad ties and two-by-fours for
Timber Developing Company. At one time he had 30
employees (R. 121). He then went to Renton, lVashington, where he erected a store building, a barber shop
and a cafe employing sub-contractors and also set up
his sawmill on the lake, purchasing logs from .Tippo
Loggers (R. 122). The buildings cost $18,000.00,
$2,000.00 and $7,000.00 (R. 183). He left Renton for
Moses Lake, having lost his health at Renton and al
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l\Ioses Lake "I accumulated a place there that turned
into quite a lot of money" which he sold five or six years
before the trial. Upon leaving, he leased his sawmill with
an option to buy and had to take it back (R. 122).
He had developed asthma in Washington and had
to spend several weeks in the hospital, from which asthma
he never recovered. Ile has been on cortisone for 14
years which has slowed down his mind and intellect and
it "takes me a little longer to think things out" and
he is unable to do physical work ( R. 123) .
Two of his boys were in Salt Lake City going to
school and in 1959 he and his other two boys came here
so that they could be together (R. 124). Since being in
Salt Lake he has hauled trailers for National Trailer
Convoy for a year and a half at which he made no
money.
In August, 1961, he looked at some possible bowling sites with Ida Young and in November, 1961, she
called Harold Tracy of the Brunswick Company and
set up a meeting ( R. 126). He went alone to see Tracy
who was second in line to Mr. Dobbs at Brunswick
Company and told Tracy it was necessary to have someone erect the building for a bowling lane and Tracy
said this 'vas no problem (R. 127). Tracy and Carl
Dinius and plaintiff looked at a two-acre site in Magna,
which Brunswick had under option (R. 128). They
talked about 16 or 24 lanes at a price of $15,000.00
each for equipment only, not including the building and
land ( R. 129). They said several building contractors
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were available. Plaintiff journeyed to Washington to
inquire about financing and to inquire into the bowliug
business. He returned in early January, 1962, and told
Harold Tracy he could raise $32,000.00 which would
be 10 % down on 24 lanes ( R. 130) . They said it was
necessary for him to go to managing school and a
Doctor King would finance the building "and when I
got back they would have the set up for the building of
the building." He went to Chicago to school for two
weeks in February, 1962, and when he returned, he contacted Doctor King who had decided not to go any
further with the building (R. 131).
A week or ten days later, Tracy called and said he
had a builder named Jack Charlesworth. He went to
Brunswick's office and there was a meeting in the back
part attended by Tracy, Dinius, Dobbs - part of the
time-his son Dee and Charlesworth came in late (R.
132).
In introducing Charlesworth, Tracy used the language quoted by Appellant at Page 7 of its Brief. They
discussed a 23,000 square foot building which would cost
$240,000.00 and which Charlesworth said he would rent
at 1 % per month. Tracy said that wasn't high as all
their bowling alleys were paying about the same rent
(R. 133). He had previously told Tracy he wanted to
rent the building with option to buy. Charlesworth
wanted 60 days to decide and wanted a writing to giYe
him that right. Tracy said "go ahead and sign that slip
because everybody has to have time to decide to do a
job that big or not" so plaintiff signed and didn't get
4

a copy (R. 134). Charlesworth took the paper but says
he doesn't have it (R. 135). This paper gave Charlesworth 60 <lays to decide whether he would build and
lease with an option to buy. "I was tied up but he
wasn't." The name Compact Building Company was on
the piece of paper. Charlesvvorth was to buy the land,
build, and lease to plaintiff the .Magna site (R. 135).
Plaintiff told Dinius and Tracy he was interested in
more than a bow ling alley and the site was too small.
He and Ida Young had found another site to which he
took Tracy and Dinius. Tracy said it was a wonderful
site, on the high side of the road, with good location and
it was fine with them (R. 136-137).
Between the first meeting with Charlesworth and
April 11, when a contract was signed, there were about
three meetings between Tracy, Charlesworth and Jardine at the Brunswick office looking at plans (R. 140).
Tracy told plaintiff "if anything went wrong - there
was any chance he couldn't build the building, there were
other contractors he could get." (R. 141).
Exhibit P-4 calls for a down payment of $9,000.00
to be made by Jardine and repaid by Charlesworth.
This subject was discussed by Dinius, Charlesworth,
Ida Young, .Jardine and his son two or three times.
The main one was at the Indigo Cafe as a result of a
telephone call from Brunswick by either Tracy or
Dinius and an invitation to go to the Indigo with Dinius
and Charlesworth and discuss getting the building moving (R. 146). Dinius called and said he had hold of
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Jack and wanted to discuss this subject. Jardine, J\irs.
Young and Dee went in one car and Dinius and Charlesworth came together. After a nice lunch "The problem
was brought up about Jack not having the down payment for this ground" because his money was "tied up"
and he wondered if Jardine would advance the down
payment. "Carl Dinius said if this would hurry the thing
and get it in gear he thought it would be a good thing,
so before this meeting was let out, I told them I would
advance the money for it." (R. 147). The figure mentioned was $9,000.00 (R. 148). "I remember that Dinius
said if we can get this thing started now, we will have
it open for the leagues. If it drags on getting started
we could get in trouble for the fall leagues. But I was
anxious to get the thing going and had the money and
since that was their recommendation, I didn't think it
was wrong to go ahead and do it." ( R. 148).
After the meeting, Ida Young prepared Exhibit
P-5 based on the conversation with Charlesworth and
Dinius that the money was to be paid back before it
would be needed for the bowling equipment (R. 149).
Exhibit P-9 was the lease with option to buy on
an earnest money form prepared by Ida Young and
signed on May 25 (R. 152). At that time construction
had not started. Harold Tracy, Dinius and Jardine
were concerned about getting the building started. Ida
Young called and said Charlesworth had called her and
wondered if Jardine would advance "this other $23,000.00" as his money was still tied up. Jardine told her
6

if Charlesworth could get a statement from Dobbs that
it was okey that he would let him have the money. The
$23,000.00 was the balance of the $32,000.00 down payment on equipment arranged for in Washington. A few
days later, Charlesworth brought a note from Dobbs to
Ida Young and Jardine went over to her office to read
it ( R. 156) . Jardine called Dobbs on the telephone: "I
told him J adz had requested this additional $23,000.00,
that he couldn't seem to get his money released up there
yet for a few days and asked him if it was all right to
give him this money. And he said over the phone that
he thought it was all right but to 'protect' myself. He
didn't say how to 'protect' myself or what to do about
'protecting' myself." (R. 157). He got the money from
\ Vashington and had Charlesworth sign a note Exhibit
P-11 which was signed by Charlesworth personally and
in behalf of Compact Building and secured by life insurance.
Construction started soon after the $23,000.00 was
made available and had bogged down and was in trouble
by September 4, 1962 (R. 162, 161, 163).
On cross-examination, Jardine testified that he had
a bookkeeper in his sawmill business but consulted no
lawyer: "I didn't have anything to have a lawyer about."
His enterprises were not profitable as money is made
nowdays "but they were livings" (R. 181).
In Renton, the plaintiff employed a lawyer to get
his property zoned and to prepare a contract with the
man vrnrki11g the grocery store. The people he purchased
7

his land from had an attorney and plaintiff used him
(R. 182). His maximum gross income from the sawmill
business was 15 times $27.00 per day (R. 183). When
he left Renton, he leased the sawmill with an option to
buy and had the same attorney draw the lease because
he didn't know how to do it himself. The lessee went
broke, the equipment froze and he got salvage only on
the repossession handled by the same attorney (R. 184185).

He and his wife had talked about Moses Lake,
Washington, and on a trip back from Salt Lake, they
stopped and purchased 160 acres from a real estate
broker, employing no attorney. He farmed the land and
two or three years later bought another 160 acres and
then after another two or three years water came on
the property. These transactions were handled by a real
estate broker and not an attorney (R. 186). In 1959,
plaintiff was worth about $250,000.00 consisting of his
property in Renton, including the sawmill, and the farm
in Moses Lake ( R. 187-188).
He discussed the bowling lanes construction with
Ida Young but didn't "consult her." He made up his
own mind (R. 183, 198). In reference to Exhibit P-5
"she was a little bit concerned about this, but I wasn't.
I felt like that where Brunswick recommended Jack, and
he had to have this property to get a loan on, that I was
safe enough in signing it to him." (R. 198).
He and Ida Young talked about the promissory
note which is Exhibit P-11 and which she prepared.
8

"She said we 11eeded to have something on this thing,
and \Ve gol: this note and we thought it was sufficient."
( R. 200) . They thought they had security for the loan
of $32,000.00.
"I was looking for wlial Brunswick had told
me on the phone. They recommended this man.
They sent him to me. \Vhcn I got a note besides
from him all<l his company, I felt like I was plenty
secure or why would they send him to me in
the first place?" ) Il. 201).
He didn't consider going to an attorney on this matter
(R. 202). He didn't need a lawyer as he depended on
Brunswick and Ida Young was a real estate broker. He
has furnished financial statements but has never asked
for any an<l didn't consider asking for one from Compact
Builders ( R. 208). "I thought where Brunswick recommended this man, I didn't think I had anything to worry
about. I was buying nearly $400,000.00 worth of equipment.
"Q

A

l t \1'as a big transaction wasn't it?

Yes. But a company that you buy that
mueh equipment from would recommend
somebody that couldn't build the building,
I just couldn't believe this is true." (R.
209).

He went to Hill Field beeause Charlesworth wanted
to show him the project there but he was not really concerned about it. Charlesworth showed 15 or 20 houses
under collstruction and a temporary office building (R.
210).
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The decision on whether lG or 24< lanes should he
built depended on Brunswick's surveys ( R. 213).
Tracy, Dohbs and plaintiff went to see Sid Hormau
about building the building but Horman wasn't interested. There was no discussion between the Brunswick
people and plaintiff of the solvency of Charlesworth or
Compact Builders. Did he think it strange that Charlesworth didn't have $9,000.00 available to start the buil<ling? "'V ell, I think this crossed my mind a time or two
- but - well, in my own business I didn't have on
occasion money available to jump into something else,
so I could kind of understand if he had it coming. I didn't
think there was any problem in this." ( R. 214-215).
After the loan of $9,000.00 and Charlesworth approached him for the $23,000.00 was he surprised that
Charlesworth didn't have it? (R. 218).
"A

'Vell, they recognized this man, sai<l he
would have the money on the 15th and they
didn't need it until later, so I couldn't see
any complication." (The word "recognized" should obviously be "recommended") (R. 219-220).

After Charlesworth had failed in the project and
deeded the land back, the plaintiff made efforts to get
the building completed. He talked to Bettilyon Realty
Company (R. 224); Brunswick attempted to arrange
a loan with A. R. Guss Corporation, John Price turned
it down, A ..M. F. didn't have the money and wouldn't
interfere with a Brunswick Building, all after the liens
10

had been picked up on the building (R. 225). The Court
took judicial notice of the Conesco file Third District
Court Action No. 138888 (R. 226-227). The creditors
reduced their claims in the Conesco action to give a total
figure which plaintiff could try to finance (R. 227). One
Rother bought the property and got the benefit of scaling down the amount. Plaintiff continued to seek
financing and the Brunswick Company proposed Salk
Company, Tracy and Dobbs did the negotiating (R.
228). They negotiated with Ledbetter Corporation
which had movie actors back of it and with the Bowers
Building, Small Business Administration, Walker Bank,
Old West Insurance, (R. 229) and Lockhart Company
(R. 230). Reduction of the claims was from $70,000.00
to $50,000.00. Rother paid $50,000.00 and held the property while plaintiff attempted to get financing (R. 231).
Dinius and Tracy were present when Charlesworth's
draws from his building projects were discussed. Dinius
felt the draw would be okey, in language quoted by the
Appellant in its Brief at Page 7 and 8 (R. 232, 233).
Jardine relied on Tracy and the Brunswick Company
because they brought Charlesworth in (R. 235). The
size of the portion to be deeded to Compact Building
Company ·was directed by llarold Tracy (R. 235-236).

The testimony of Mrs. Ida Y oiing. She is the manager of the mortgage loan department at Beehive State
Bank ( R. 237) and was a real estate broker for 11 years
(IL 238). She showed Jardine a number of types of
businesses ( R. 239) . Before any contact was made with
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the Brunswick Company, she had contacted builders
and figured building costs and discussed them with Jardine (R. 240-241). Brunswick wanted J ardine's financial statement ( R. 242) .
There were several meetings at Brunswick arouud
April 11 and statements were made by both Harold
Tracy and Dinius about Charlesworth's finances, that
after he completed this building Brunswick themselves
are going to finance him. Charlesworth knew exactly
how to build to house the Brunswick lanes and Mrs.
Young was under the impression from these conversations "that he had built a good many of them." (R. 252).
Harold Tracy called Mrs. Young with Charlesworth there and wanted her to prepare an Earnest
Money Receipt for Charlesworth which is Exhibit P-17
and relates to construction by Charlesworth of bowling
lanes at Pleasant Grove ( R. 253) .
Charlesworth called her and asked about Jardine
loaning him "the $23,000.00 that he had ready for his
bowling equipment down payment." (R. 258-259).
Dinius remained in Brunswick's employ until after
August, 1962 (R. 265-266).
After May 31, when Charlesworth was arranging
mortgage financing, on the building, Dinius said "it
didn't make a whole lot of difference. They wanted 1\Ir.
Charlesworth to try around several different places but
if he was unable to, Brunswick would finance the building and Charlesworth on it. He also told me at the time
12

that Brunswick - some of the officers of the Brunswick Corporation were officers in a loan investment
group and this is where the money would come from."
(R.

~69).

At her first meeting of Dinius and Charlesworth
after the slip had been signed giving Charlesworth an
option and before the visit to the Charlesworth project
at Hill Field, the remarks quoted at Page 8 of Appellant's Brief were made (R. 274). "lHr. Dinius stating
lhat he knew exactly how to build the building for the
Brunswick lanes. In fact, along with building this building and knowing how to set it up for the Brunswick
lanes, ~Ir. Dinius made the remark after .Mr. Charlesworth completed this project from then on Brunswick
was going to finance .Mr. Charlesworth on the rest of the
buildings." ( R. 27 5). This was before advance of the

$9,ooo.oo (R.

209).

J cssie 1ll. Paine testified that he is assistant administrator of the Utah State Department of Contractors,
the information in whose files is available to the public.
The department publishes an annual roster summarizing
all the contractors (R. 277). Compact Building applied
for a license July 17, 1961 which was issued September
11, HHH for Class 2 limiting contracts to $75,000.00
( R. 280-281). J aek G. Charlesworth took the examination September 1, 1961. On July 25, 1962, notice was
sent to Compact Buildings of cancellation of its license
because it 110 longer financially qualified. Notice of this
intent had been sent out July 2, 1962 (R. 283-284).
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The conversation with Dinius about future building
by Charlesworth which was to be financed by Brunswick
occurred before the $9,000.00 was advanced by Jardine
(R. 290).

Jack G. Charles·worth testified he had been in the
construction business for 15 years (R. 291). He became
acquainted with Dinius, Tracy and Dobbs of Brunswick
Corporation in 1961 after a letter "asking them if they
would be interested in financing or being interested in
my putting up a building with some of their assistance"
following which Tracy came to see him ( R. 292).
Exhibit P-5 was signed on about April 11 connected with the conversation in Ida Young's office which
followed by a few days a conversation in a restaurant
between Carl Dinius, Charlesworth, Ida Young and
Jardine. Before the meeting he and Brunswick had
discussed it, first with Tracy and Dinius, then with
Dinius, Jardine not being present. He and Dinius went
to the restaurant together ( R. 293-294) .
Exhibit P-10 was signed by Mr. Dobbs in his presence (R. 294). He had previously talked to Dinius
about the matter and after talking to Dinius had talked
to Ida Young also before he talked to Dobbs (R. 295).
He had more than one conyersation with Dinius as they
were meeting regularly "trying to get this together"
(R. 296). He means get them together mentally (R.
297).

His conversation with .Mr. Dinius was that things
weren't going too "·ell at Hill Field and he had to fiwl
14

some other source of revenue if he was going to go ahead
with the bowling alley. In his conversation with Dinius,
he learned that J ar<line had money that had been set
aside to make the down payment on the bowling equipment. And with this information he went to l\Irs. Young
to see if he could borrow that money, and she told him
that if he was able to get Brunswick to give permission
to use it for a little while, on the assumption he would
be able to get it back, they would go ahead and release
the money ( ll. 297) . :Mrs. Young got in touch with
Jardine and he agreed "providing I was fairly certain
that I would have it back in time to pay for the sight
draft when the equipment arrived." (R. 298). He told
Dinius that and then talked to Dobbs after Dinius had
done so ( H. 298) .
I thought the letter might be a little soft and I asked
Dobbs if that's all he could put in there and he said yes
so I accepted the letter as it was (R. 299).
P-11, the promissory note, includes the $23,000.00
contemplated by P-10 and the $9,000.00 advanced on
April 11 ref erred to on P-5 ( R. 300) .

APPELLANT'S POINTS
1. The Defendant's motion to dismiss at the close

of plaintiff's case should have been granted because the
eYidence constituting plaintiff's case in chief does not
show a cause of action generally.
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2. Plaintiff was contributorily negligent.

3. Plaintiff is barred from recovery because of a
release executed by him.
4. The findings of fact and conelusions of law do

not support an award and the judgment is contrary to
law.
The Appellant has taken the nine requirements of
a fraud action from St,uck v. Delta Land and Water
Company, 63 U. 495, 227 P. 791, and then argued that
no one of the nine points was established by plaintiff's
evidence. These tests, as modified by the pre-trial order,
the statements of counsel and the view of the District
Court will be argued.
Points two and three will also be argued.
Appellant's point four is that the findings of fact
and conclusions of law do not support an award and
the judgment is contrary to law. This point is dismissed
by the Appellant at Page 31 of its Brief with the statement that the findings and conclusions ignore appellant's
first three points. In other words, the Appellant is
abandoning his fourth point except as prevailing on one
of the other three points affects the findings of fact and
conclusions of law and judgment.
There is no challenge that the findings of fact support the conclusions of law and that these support the
judgment, and no attack on the :Memorandum Decision
is made.

16

POINTS TO TIE ARGUED
1. Defendant's motion to dismiss at the dose of

plaintiff's case was properly denied.
2. There is no evidence of contributory negligence.

a.

Plaintiff is not barred Ly any release executed
in the Conesco action.

POINT I. DEFENDANT'S lHOTION TO
DISl\IISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S
CASE 'VAS PROPERLY DENIED.
The first cause of action ( R. 1), and the pre-trial
order (R. 8) set forth representations by the defendant
as to Charlesworth and reasonable reliance thereon by
the plaintiff to his damage, the plaintiff contending that
the defendant either knew or should have known that
the representations ·were false.
In the Court's .Memorandum Decision, the fourth
requirement of a cause of action for deceit is stated by
the Court to be:
"That defendant negligently or recklessly
made the assertion as a fact without reasonable
grounds to believe it to Le true." (R. 62).
"Tith this change, we shall consider the elements
of an action for deceit as analyzed in the Stuck case,
as did the trial court in its carefully considered and
written memorandum decision ( R. 62-78).
Appellant points out that the evidence is to be considered most fayorably to the Respondent. This is the
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review of defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint
at the close of plaintiff's evidence in a case tried before
the Court without a jury, in accordance with Rule 41 ( b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This situation
was considered by this Court in Jf7inegar v. Slim Olsen,
Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205, where the Court established the rule in this type of case, the trial judge in that
case having granted the motion for non-suit at the close
of plaintiff's evidence. The review was held to be:
"Taking the evidence and the inferences most
favorable to the plaintiff. * * * True, normally
a Court acting without a jury should not grant
a motion for non-suit when there is some competent, substantial evidence to support every
issue to make a case, if the evidence on all these
issues is credible."
See also: Lawrence v. Bll1nbcrr;cr R. Co., 3 Utah 2d
335; Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404
P. 2d 30. 'Ve shall, therefore, consider the evidence
from plaintiff's case favorably to the plaintiff and the
inferences flowing therefrom. The elements of the deceit
action will be argued as stated by Judge Croft in his
Memorandum Decision (R. 62).
(a) Representation of An

El1'i.~·ting

Fact.

Mr. Jardine informed Harold Tracy in one of
their first meetings that he knew nothing about the
bowling business, needed to have a building constructed
for him, and leased to him, and that his finances were
limited (R. 127, 134). He made a trip to \Vashington
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to raise money and came back with $32,000.00 available
for the purpose of buying bowling equipment from the
defendant of which he informed Tracy and entered into
a contract calling for the $32,000.00 down ( R. 130).
Tracy and Dinius stated that finding a Luilder to
do this job \vas not difficult and never at any time
suggested to plaintiff that he should go out and find
a buil<ler, but led him to believe that this \Vas a part
of their service and they would find someone who could
construct the building, complete it and lease it to the
plaintiff in which to house the equipment plaintiff was
purchasing from defendant. Indeed, the fact that
Brunswick optioned a site at .Magna, held numerous
conferences with the builder alone and with the builder
and Jardine together, and assumed responsibility for
seeing that the building was moving, bear out this role
of defendant and its employees Dobbs, Tracy and
Dinius. This conduct amounted to representations by
Brunswick that it undertook to get investor and builder
together with the operator and purchaser of the equipment as a ~;ervice incident to the sale of equipment in
an amount ,vhich far exceeded the cost of the building
and land combined ($360,000.00 for equipment, $240,000.00 for building and $4,000.00 for land [R. 129,
130 and 133 and 139 J).
Tracy called .T ardine on the telephone and told
him he had a builder named Jack Charlesworth and
arranged to lrnve them meet at Brunswick's offices with
Brunswick people (R. 132).
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It is important to note that Charlesworth had never
constructed a building for Brunswick, and there is no
evidence that he ever constructed a large building for
anybody, and certainly no evidence that Brunswick
knew of any building Charlesworth had constructed,
except that he was planning some type of project at
Riverdale, Utah in 1961 and had something to do with
building houses at Hill Field in 1962 (R. 292, 215216, 210). The initial contact between Charlesworth and
Brunswick was by Charlesworth in the Fall of 1961
when he inquired in connection with his Riverdale project whether Brunswick "would be interested in financing or being interested in my putting up a bowling alley
with some of their assistance" ( R. 392) following which
Tracy came to see him. So Tracy knew and Brunswick
is charged with knowing that Charlesworth didn't have
financing in late 1961.

By this time, Jardine had signed a contract to purchase $360,000.00 worth of equipment from Brunswick
(R. 130) and had been sent to a Brunswick manager's
school in Chicago (R. 131) with a statement that when
he got back "they would have the set up for the building
of the building." (R. 131).
said:

In introducing Jack Charlesworth, Mr. Tracy

( 1) Jack Charlesworth is president of Compact
Building Company.
( 2) He could build these buildings.
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( 3) II c could finance these buildings.

( 4) There is nothing to worry about.
( 5) Sign the slip giving Charlesworth 60 days to

decide because everybody has to have time to decide to
do a job that big.
( 6) Just prior to the advance of the first $9,000.00,

Dinius sai<l that Charlesworth "knew exactly how to
build the buildings in order to house the Brunswick
lanes" and gave the "impression he had built a goorr
many of them."
(7) Tracy told Jardine

that if anything went
wrong there were other contractors he could get, imply·
ing that Brunswick would see to it.
( 8) Dinius told Jardine that Charlesworth "had a

mce setup" at his Hill Field project.
These were representations of fact within the requirements of a cause of action for deceit.
In Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Vol. 1,
Page 560, this definition of "fact'" is given:
"The courts will ordinarily classify a statement as fact if it relates to an event or state of
affairs which either exists at the present moment
or has had a past existence and if that event or
state of affairs is susceptible of knowledge. Under this definition statements relating to the
future are not fact; neither are statements relating to matters impossible of ascertainment at the
time made."
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Expressions of financial condition of a third person
may be actionable for fraudulent misrepresentation or
"An opinion stated with such conscious ignorance of its truth to be equivalent to a falsehood,
or an opinion stated as being based on a careful
investigation was not made, or a statement made
in the form of an opinion, but meant to impress
and impressing the mjured party as a statement
of fact may be actionable.
"Where the representation is made as a positive statement of fact, however, it (the other elements of fraud being preo;ent) may impose liability even though the speaker actually believes
in the existence of facts on which he bases his
assertion. Under such circumstances, the representation may properly be relied on, and without
investigation." 37 C.J.S., Fraud, §48a.
In D1wcan v. Ston,eham, 253 N. Y. 183, 170 N. E.
571, the defendant who was in a business relationship
to the plaintiff advised him:
"'Ve have investigated :Messrs. E. II. Clark
and Company and believe them to be financially
responsible and fully capable of carrying out
any obligations they assume in the taking over
of this business."
which was held not to be a mere opinion or prophecy
but a statement that investigation had been made and
belief formed thereon, uttered as though defendant
intended that plaintiff would rely on it.
In Murray v. Lamb, 174 Ore. 239, 148 P.2d 797,
801, the defendant had represented to a prospective
lender that he had financial ability and that he "was
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erecting or about to erect" a basilica in a nearby town.
The Court held that these were more than expressions
of opinion and that the plaintiff was justified in relying
on them.
In Broaddus Company v. Binkley, (Tex. App.
1932) 54 S.,V.2<l 586, the court found that plaintiff
through its agent falsely and negligently represented
to defendants that the tenants who had leases on certain
property were financially sound. Defendant relied upon
this representation as a material inducement in signing
the contract of exchange. The court affirmed this holding that the plaintiff undertook to state facts concerning responsibility making it appear that he had investigated the facts and negotiated the lease. He assumed
to speak with knowledge of the facts and what he stated
was, therefore a representation of fact rather than expression of opinion and no independent inquiry or
investigation was required.
In Granberg v. 'l'urnham, 166 Cal. App. 2d 390,
333 P.2d 423, it is held that representations made to
one person with intention that they will be repeated
to another and acted upon by him and which are so
repeated and so acted upon will support an action as
much as if the representation had been made directly.
This is cited for the reason that Mrs. Ida Young was
also the receipient of representations, which, it may be
inferred, were made with the intention that they be
relayed to plaintiff as they in fact were. See also Ellis
v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 283, 373 P.2d 382.
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(b) Its Falsity.

Compact Buildings Company was not incorporated
as of February, 1962, and it had no_president. When it
was incorporated on April 11, 1962, the name first
listed among the directors and the one listed as registered agent was Archie P. Beck, who was presumably
the president, as Compact Building Company had been
his company (Exhibit P-2 and R. 280). Exhibit P-14
shows Archie P. Beck as president, and P-14 shows
Charlesworth as secretary and treasurer.
Charlesworth's ability to complete the building and
finance the building is proven false. He was in dire
financial difficulty at that time (Exhibit P-1); on July
2, 1962, he was notified by the Department of Contractors that his financial difficulties required cancellation of his license ( R. 284) and he was unable to
obtain a mortgage on the property ( R. 209 and 268269), except a mortgage for $5,500.00 (Exhibit P-12)
which pitiful amount is eloquent proof of the falsity
of his ability to finance a $240,000.00 building.
The statement that there was nothing to worry
about is a representation that Brunswick was well
acquainted with Charlesworth and his work and that
Brunswick and Charlesworth between them would see
to it that the building was constructed. This was false
both in its implications that Brunswick was acquainted
with Charlesworth and in its indication that Brunswick
was in a position to assure Jardine that there was
nothing to worry about.
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The statement that Charlesworth knew how to
build lanes to house Brunswick equipment and its implication that Charlesworth was experienced in this fiel<l
were false.
Brunswick knew or was charged with knowing that
Charlesworth had no ability to finance buildings because
in his initial request to Brunswick, he had asked whether
Brunswick would either finance him or assist him in
building ( R. 292) . Far from having financial ability
it is reasonable to assume, from an examination of the
file in Conesco v. Compact Building, and the nature of
the liens that the $23,000.00 went not into the Jardine
project, but was otherwise used. (See R. 215-216).
And when Charlesworth got into trouble, Brunswick did not come to his rescue and many contacts with
builders and financers proved fruitless (R. 224-225,
228-230).

The "nice set-up" which Dinius spoke of produced
nothing toward the building of plaintiff's building and
Charlesworth had to seek other financing ( R. 297) .
(c) Its Materiality.

Jardine was most recently a trucker, a farmer, a
sawmill operator, and a builder of three buildings costing a total of $27 ,000.00, with an eighth grade education, suffering from asthma and slowed up mentally
by taking cortisone for 14 years. He had no experience
in the bow ling business and no experience dealing with
general contractors. He supplied a financial statement,
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told defendant he had no means of constructing a building but could raise enough money to make a down
payment on equipment and accepted Brunswick's offer
of help in finding someone to finance and build a building to be leased to him. I3runswick diligently undertook this and knew that when Dr. King was unable
to go forward, Jardine had no place to turn and the
project was at that point dead.
Brunswick revived the project by telling Jardine
they had Jack Charlesworth and brought them together
for the purposeof getting a building built in order to
accommodate a sale of $360,000.00 worth of equipment.
Jardine was impressed with the importance of the
Brunswick name, and had full confidence in what its
people were doing and upon Tracy's recommendation,
without ever having seen Charlesworth before, committed himself to have Charlesworth build his building,
binding himself and giving Charlesworth 60 days to
decide. Mr. Tracy told Jardine the very things about
Charlesworth that would induce him to place reliance
on the stranger.
Brunswick led Jardine to believe that it had prior
experience with Charlesworth, that he could perform
the job and that it stood back of him.
( d) That Defendant N e,gligently Or Recklessl.lf
Made The Assertion As A Fact Without Reasonable
Ground,s To Believe It To Be True.

One of the first things Brunswick required of
Jardine was a personal financial statement (R. 208,
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242). He reasonably assumed that the same thing was

required of Charlesworth and that Brunswick knew
Charlesworth from prior dealing and that Brunswick
was aware of Charlesworth's financial condition just
as they were aware of his. Brunswick was warned of
the possibility that Charlesworth was not financially
stable by Charlesworth's request for financial help
when he first contacted Brunswick in the Fall of 1961
(R. 292). A credit investigation or a check of the
county records would have disclosed numerous judgments against Charlesworth personally, Charlesworth's
companies, and Archie Beck and Compact Building
Company (Exhibit P-1). A telephone call to the
Department of Contractors would have disclosed that
Charlesworth was not the president of Compact Building Company, was not licensed to handle a $240,000.00
building and after July 2, that the company was in
financial difficulty. Also, Charlesworth told Dinius that
things were not going well at Hill Field and he had
to have other financing ( R. 297) .
The Urunswick Company had a legal responsibility
to inform itself before it recklessly embarked the plaintiff and Charlesworth on a big building venture in which
Brunswick stood to benefit greatly if it succeeded, and
would expect to suffer no loss if it failed, knew of
J ardine's reliance, and was immediately aware at the
first conference and was continuously aware that thereafter Jardine looked to Brunswick for guidance and
assumed that Brunswick was well acquainted with
Charlesworth and his company and had full confidence
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in them. This type of representation, without knowledge of the facts whereof one speaks and recommends,
incurs legal responsibility.
Brunswick was not a Yolunteer. Jardine came to
Brunswick to do business and entered into a large contract, tying up all his available assets before Brunswick
turned to the problem of getting a building to house
the equipment it had contracted. It had a large stake
in the success of the project and was obligated to protect
its trusting purchaser against a financially irresponsible
commitment.
It is well established that representations of financial condition or other facts, made with the intention
that they be relied upon, are actionable and this is
especially true where some relationship exists between
the parties from which the representee is entitled to
assume that the representor would use care to be
informed before speaking, knowing that the representee is relying on the statements made. The statement must be made under circumstances which indicate
that the representee will rely on the statement and does
in fact rely. 37 C.J.S., Fraud,§ 48 (a).

The elements of such an action are that the representation be one of fact, which was known to be untrue
or else recklessly made, for the intent of deceiving
and that the other party was induced to act upon it
and did rely upon it to his injury. 23 Am. J ur., Frau,d

and Deceit, § 20.
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The Restatement of Torts no'v going into its Second series, in the 11th and 12th tentative drafts, recogniz.es the right of action against
"one who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or a transaction in which he
has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by the justifiable reliance
upon such information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information."
The comments indicate that the duty extends to those
not directly engaged in the transaction but have a
pecuniary interest in it such as corporate officers and
promoters who furnish information which indirectly
benefits them.
In Ellis v. Hale, supra, this Court upheld an order
dismissing a complaint attempting to allege negligent
misrepresentation. The Court noted, however, that
negligent representation will sustain an action when
made with the intention that it be relied on and is made
without reasonable diligence or competence in ascertaining the verity of the assertion and when there is
a special duty of care running from the representor to
the representee. The Court also noted that if equivocal
or ambiguous language is used intentionally "with the
hope that one of several meanings will be understood
by the representee" a situation would be presented
which could well result in liability.
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In International Products Company t'. Erie Railway Company, 244 N.Y. a:n, 155 NJfi. t>62, u(i4, the

plaintiff inquired as to arrival of goods upon defendant's dock so as to obtain insurance. The defendant
acknowledged arrival and designated the dock on which
the goods were placed, whieh information was erroneous. The goods were destroyed by fire without coverage.
The court found liability against the defendant for its
negligent representation:
"Liability in such cases arises only where there
is a duty, if one speaks at all, to give the correct
information. And that inn>lves many considerations. There must be knowledge, or its equivalent,
that the information is desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom it is givei1 intends to rely
on it; that if false or erroneous, he will because
of it be injured in person or property. Finally,
the relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals
and conscience the one has the right to rely upon
the other for information, and the other giving
information owes a duty to give it with care.***
Words negligently spoken may justify the recovery of the proximate damages caused by faith
in their accuracy."
Assurances that a man owned 160 acres of land,
had a good credit rating with fine bank standing, and
that plaintiff would have a first mortgage on a thresher
being sold was found actionable in Freernan v. Harbaugh Co., 114 Minn. 283, 130 N. ,V. l llO. False information given by a publie weigher, resulting from negligence was held actionable in the leading case of Glanzer
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v. Shepard, ~33 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275; and in Swanson v. Solomon, (\Vash. 1957) 314 P.2d 655, where,
in the sale of the home, the defendants represented that
there was enough property on either side for a path
circling the home, which was discoverable by survey
but negligently made. lHisrepresentations as to figures
of cost given by the defendant to the purchasing plaintiff were actionable because negligently made in Clar
v. Board of Trade of San Jl'rancisco, (Cal. App., 1958)
331 P.2d 8!J at 95. Representations as to a letter of
credit which actually had expired was negligent and
actionable in Courteen Seed Company v. Hong Kong
& Shanghai Banking Corporation, 245 N. Y. 377, 157
N.E. 272. Negligent representation of ownership of a
lot was actionable in Pattridge v. You1nans, 107 Colo.
122, 109 P.2d 646.
( e) The Defendant's Intent That It Should Be
Acted U pun B;t; The Person To Whom It is Made And
In The Manner Reasonably Contemplated.
It is plain from what has previously been said that
the very purpose of getting the plaintiff and Charlesworth together was to get a building constructed so
as to house equipment to be sold by the defendant to
the plaintiff. That was the purpose of the contacts with
Dr. King, with Sid Horman and with Charlesworth .
.T ardine was a virtual stranger in Salt Lake City and
defendant knew this from the facts that his holdings
were in 'Vashington and he had to go there to see about
raising money (R. 129-131). Defendant's intent that
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the representations be acted upon is made plain by
the fact that when Charlesworth requested, in the first
meeting, that Jardine commit himself and give Charlesworth 60 days to think it over, Tracy urged J ardinc
to sign the slip advising him that it was reasonable,
there then being no information about Charlesworth
except Tracy's statements and recommendations concerning him and the circumstances of the positions of
the parties, Jardine placiug himself in a position of
reliance upon Brunswick with no ability to go forward
except with persons Brunswick could produce.
Defendant's intent continued through the entire
negotiations. Tracy and Dinius reassured Jardine when
Charlesworth was having trouble finding money that
Brunswick would finance him if he had no other source,
that Brunswick intended to have Charlesworth as their
builder, in that Brunsv,:ick sent two other negotiations
between Charlesworth and bowling alley proprietors
over to Mrs. Young for integration, and in the fact
before Jardine undertook any step ·with reference to
the purchase of the land, the division of the land, advancing the down payment for Charlesworth, and iu
loaning the $9,000.00 and the $2a,ooo.oo, he conferred
extensively with Dinius and Tracy and later with Dobbs
and obtained their approval on all that was done.
Dinius and Charlesworth together planned the request for the loan of the $9,000.00 down payment on
the land. They came together to the meeting and presented a joint plan-Bnmswick endorsing Charles-
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worth and requesting the advance (R. 147-148, 249).
And it was Dinius who told Charlesworth there was
another $2B,OOO.OO being held which might as well be
used to get the building going, which was of great
concern to Brunswick (R. 156-157, 297). And Jardine
this time, through 1\iirs. Young, told Charlesworth he'd
have to have a letter from Brunswick (R. 156, 259, 207
and Exhibit P. 10). And when the letter wasn't clear-cut
he called Dobbs on the phone to get re-assurance, which
Dobbs gave in such manner and language as to satisfy
Jardine (R. 157, 200, 201) which Dobbs knew from
the telephone conversation as well as from Charlesworth's request and the nature of the letter.
In Duncan v. Stoneham, supra, the court noted
that defendants had placed no limitations upon use of
their representation, thus supporting the intent that
it be acted upon.
The Restatement of Torts 2d, Draft Nos. II and
12 of Section 552, indicates that some cases hold that
the representor must know the party who intends to
rely on the information before liability will ensue.
Others require only an intent that it be acted on by
someone of a class. Under either test, plaintiff was
justified here in relying on the representations.
As contemplated by 37 C.J.S., Fraud,§ 48a, the representations here made were meant to impress Jardine
and were a material inducement in causing him to rely
on Charlesworth m the manner intended by the representor.
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In the article at 24 Harvard Law Review, 415,
at 423, Professor Bohlen cites Stiff' v. Ashton, 155
.Mass. 133, 133 for the rule that

"If, without more, the plaintiff spoke or acted
falsely, knowing or having cause to believe that
his words or conduct reasonably might influence
the defendant's action"
the defendant is liable.

(f) Plaintiff's Ignorance Of Its Falsity.
There is no evidence ,vhatever that Jardine knew
that Charlesworth was unable to complete this building
until bills were unpaid on the job, laborers began to
request payment of wages, and Charlesworth finally
gave a deed asking for two weeks' time in which to pull
himself out.
It is true that the plaintiff knew that Charlesworth's money was tied up and was not readily available, and that he was having trouble in completing
his mortgage, but no evidence that he ever suspected
that Charlesworth was financially exhausted and unable
to borrow on the abundant assets he must have had
to be entitled to Brunswick's endorsement, which was
without limitation, until the phone call between Dobbs
and Jardine in which full go-ahead was given except
that Jardine should "protect"' himself. This could have
meant only that the money should be advanced, that
Charlesworth was good for the money, and that Jardine
should make the amount and the pay-back definite and
assured.
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(g) Plaintiff's Reliance Upon Its Truth.

The trial court's :Memorandum Decision summarizes the testimony and then makes an appraisal
of the evidence in the last two pages of the decision.
After referring to the nature and extent of the misrepresentations the trial judge stated that the Brunswick personnnel
"Thereafter by their continued presence and
guidance influenced plaintiff's actions in advancing money to Charlesworth in such negotiations
with knowledge that plaintiff was relying on defendant's employees for such guidance to a material extent." (R. 77).
Plaintiff's evidence as a whole discloses that plaintiff went to the Brunswick company with a half-formed
notion that he would like to operate and own some
bowling lanes and was welcomed with open arms by
Messrs. Dobbs, Tracy and Dinius, who undertook to
adapt Jardine's finanical ability to the area where
lanes could profitably operate and to find someone who
could deliver the building to Jardine. The plaintiff put
himself in their hands and looked to them for their
approval of his every step. This was both reasonable
and logical. Jardine was much impressed by the name
Brunswick and by the interest which the Brunswick
people showed in the project. The Brunswick company
stood to make profit on a very large transaction and
therefore had at least an equal stake with the plaintiff
in construction of the project. Brunswick had immediately requested J ardine's financial statement and
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there was no reason for him not to place full reliance
on the advice of this large corporation acting through
its very much interested and very much involved personnel.
At the first meeting and in response to Tracy's
urgings, the plaintiff gave Charlesworth a 60-day option
to proceed with the building ( R. 134) . Having previously looked at a site in the Cottonwood area ( R.
240), he abandoned it in favor of the .Magna site at
the suggestion of Din us and Tracy ( R. 136-137) and
got their approval on the site ultimately selected (R.
137, 245).
At a meeting with Dinius and upon his urging "before this meeting was let out, I told them I would
advance the money for it," which was $9,000.00 (R.
147). He did this "since that was their recommendation" (R. 148).
Tracy and Dinius gave plaintiff the impression
that Charlesworth had built a good many bowling lanes
for them (R. 252, 275).
Plaintiff told Ida Young he would loan Charlesworth "this other $23,000.00" if Charlesworth could
get a statement from Dobbs that it was okey (R. 156).
'Vhen he called Dobbs on the telephone, he "asked him
if it was all right to give this money" ( R. 157). He
then proceeded to get the money from 'V ashigton to
be available for Charlesworth ( R. 159).
Jardine had not customarily employed attorneys
(R. 182, 186, 208).
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"I felt like that where Brunswick recommended
Jack, and he had to have this property to get a
loan on, that I was safe enough in signing it to
him." (R. 198). "I was looking for what Brunswick had told me on the phone. They recommended this man. They sent him to me. When I
got a note besides, from him and his company,
I felt like I was plenty secure or why would they
send him to me in the first place?" (R. 201).
''I thought where Brunswick recommended this
man, I didn't think I had anything to worry
about. I was buying nearly $400,000.00 worth of
equipment. *** But a company that you buy that
much equipment from would recommend somebody that couldn't build the building, I just
couldn't believe this is true." ( R. 209).
"'Vell, they recommended this man, said he
would have the money on the 15th and they didn't
need it until later, so I couldn't see any complication.'' (R. 220).

(h) Plaintiff's Right To Rely Thereon.

A reading of the transcript of plaintiff's evidence
plainly shows that plaintiff was relying on Appellant's
employees and conferred with them on so many occasions that they were compelled to know of this reliance.
In addition, Tracy and Dinius took the initiative in
getting plaintiff signed up, in getting plaintiff and
Charlesworth together and in seeing that arrangements
were made to enable Charlesworth to proceed with the
construction. There was never an occasion when plaintiff ceased to rely on the Brunswick people, or when
the Brunswick people told him that he was on his own
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and could no longer rely on what they had told him
about Charlesworth, a stranger with whom he had contracted upon Brunswick's recommendation. These are
the facts which caused the trial court to conclude:
"The Brunswick personnel played this active
role notwithstanding they did not have personal
knowledge concerning Charlesworth's background as a builder, or lack thereof; did not obtain
either a financial statement from or a credit report
on Charlesworth which if obtained would undoubtedly have revealed to defendant the long list
of judgments against Charlesworth as set forth
in case File No. 138888, that is the Conesco file
mentioned above.
In doing so, the Brunswick personnel not only
negligently or recklessly made the assertion that
Charlesworth was able to construct the needed
building to house the Brunswick equipment to be
purchased by plaintiff without reasonable
grounds to believe it to be true, but thereafter
by their continued presence and guidance influenced plaintiff's actions in advancing money to
Charlesworth in such negotiations with knowledge that plaintiff was relying on defendant's
employees for such guidance to a material extent.
In my opinion these factors constitute more than
a negligent or reckless expression of opinion concerning Charlesworth's ahilit~, to build and in my
judgment formed the basis for liability for the
consequent and proximate damage to the plaintiff."
In support of the Court's summary conclusion on
this aspect of the case, we briefly point out some of the
acts of the Brunswick employees which caused plain-
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tiff to place implicit confidence in them and their recommendation of Jack Charlesworth and his company:
Brunswick had an option on a bowling lane site
(R. 128); they said several building contractors were
available and encouraged plaintiff to go to Washington
to inquire about finances (R. 130); they sent him to
Chicago to a manager's school and said "when I got
back they would have the setup for the building of
the building" ( R. 13-) ; Tracy said he had a builder
and invited plaintiff to Brunswick's office to negotiate
a contract ( R. 132) ; Tracy urged plaintiff to give
Charlesworth an immediate option with no opportunity
for Jardine to make any investigation (R. 134); Tracy
and Dinius approved plaintiff's ultimate site (R. 136137) ; told him if anything went wrong there were other
contractors available (R. 141) ; Dinius and Charlesworth developed the plan for borrowing the original
$9,000.00 and came together to make the proposition
(R. 146-147, 249); Dinius informed Charlesworth that
plaintiff had another $23,000.00 being held in reserve
(R. 156, 295-296) ; Charlesworth then discussed the
matter with Dinius and then with Dobbs under circumstances which plainly showed that Jardine was going to
rely on Brunswick's recommendation (R. 56, 295297); on the telephone Dobbs approved the loan, knowing full well that Jardine was relying on him and was
going to advance the money, the words to "protect
yourself" reasonably meaning only to require a definite
document and not possibly meaning not to rely on what
Dobbs was saying (R. 156-158); Brunswick decided

39

whether 16 or 24 lanes should be built (R. 213) ; the
Brunswick people had never discussed with plaintiff
the solvency of Charlesworth or Compact Builders
(R. 124-215) ; Charlesworth's explanation of the delay
in getting his money on about April 11 was made in the
presence of Dinius, who then urged plaintiff to advance
the money (R. 248) ; before the $23,000.00 was advanced, Tracy and Dinius told plaintiff that after this
building was completed, Brunswick was going to finance
Charlesworth (R. 269, 275, 290); in the early stages
of financing, Dinius said if Charlesworth couldn't get
his financing, Brunswick would take care of it ( R.
269); Charlesworth met with Dinius regularly trying
to get this together (R. 296) ; and Dinius and Charlesworth together urged the advances (R. 297); Dobbs'
attention was drawn to the use of the letter (Exhibit
P-10) by Charlesworth's reference to it as "too soft"
and the knowledge therefrom of the use Charlesworth
intended to make of the letter ( R. 299).
Generally speaking, the law is that a person has a
right to rely on misrepresentations if he is one of the
persons for whose benefit and guidance the information
was intended and relies in a transaction in which it was
intended to influence his conduct, as stated in Restatement of Torts, § 552, and confirmed in the tentative
draft. Broaddus Companv v. Binkley, supra, (purchaser of real estate as to credit of tenants) ; Granberg
v. Turnham, supra, (zoning of real property representation on listing agreement relied on by purchaser) ;
International Products Company 'L'. Eric R. Company,
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supra (location of goods for insurance purposes) ;
Freeman v . .EI arbaugh, supra (purchaser of promissory note given for part payment of threshing machine
and representations by holders of notes as to credit
rating and bank standing of maker); Glanzer v. Shepard, supra ("Weight of merchandise furnished by a public
weigher to a third party purchaser) ; Duncan v. Stoneharn, supra (financial stability of a stock broker to whom
the plaintiff transferred his account concerning obligations toward customers of the defendant other than the
plaintiff as well as the plaintiff) ; Clar v. Board of
Trade of San Francisco, supra (cost figures on plumbing inventory given by Trustee and assignee for benefit
of creditors of a bankrupt corporation to the purchaser); nJurray v. Lamb, sup~a, (money loaned on
representations concerning the borrower's financial
ability and that he was erecting or about to erect a
basilica); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corporation,
31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E. 2d 769, 773-779, (reliance on
a volunteer who inspected cables for itself as insurance
carrier and released the information, reviewing the
principles discussed at 187 N.E. 2d 425, 446-453);
Ellis v. Ilale, supra, 13 Utah 2d 279, (where liability
refused because information concerning approval of
subdivision not intended to motivate the plaintiff) ;
Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802, (failure to disclose quarantine because of noxious weeds by
owner and real estate broker to purchaser of farm) ;
Harper and James on 'forts, Volume 1, Pages 545 and
547; 24< HmTanl Law Review, 415 at 423 and 435; 37
C.J .S., Frand, § 48a.
41

(i) Plaintiff's Comwquent And Proximate Darnage.
Plaintiff loaned $23,000.00 which was lost, $9,000.00
with which land was purchased and lost and which was
the value of the corner traet placed in Compact Building Company's name, according to plaintiff's evidence
(R. 342) in addition to the amount of money spent on
the project incidentally, in preparation for the project
and before Jardine was aware of Charlesworth's financial difficulties. The trial court ruled ( R. 78) that money
spent in salvage of the enterprise after Charlesworth
became unable to go forward was not recoverable and
respondent did not cross appeal (Finding 52, R. 96) .
Plaintiff's evidence was that the building was
liened beyond its value and that even with creditor's
claims compromised he was unable to get financing
and that actually the foreclosure action caused a reduction of liens in the amount of $20,000 (R. 227 and 230).
According to plaintiff's evidence, the damage
proximately caused was far in excess of the amount
allowed by the Court and there is no challenge as to
any specific item.

POINT II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
The defense of contributory negligence in an action
of deceit is not well established. For instance, in 23
Am. J ur., Fraud and Deceit, § 206, it is said:
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"Contributory negligence of a vendor or seller,
making fraud possible, is not, however, a defense
to an action in tort for damages sustained by
him. ***."
And an annotation at 17 4 A.L.R. 1004 says that the
better view is that negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense in an action for intentional fraud. The annotation is devoted specifically to representations as to the
condition of property where the representee might have
made an investigation. The tendency of courts is found
to be that one who has intentionally deceived another
will not be heard to say that the other ought not to
have trusted him.
But where the charge is negligent or reckless misrepresentation, the question properly arises whether
the representee was really mislead or is simply trying
to have the courts protect him in his credulity. Either
on the issue of contributory negligence or as an element
of the cause of action for deceit, namely right to rely
on a representation, the reasonableness of the reliance
by the plaintiff is properly examined and is discussed
under Point I (h).
Contributory negligence as such is recognized by
Professor Bohlen in Articles on :Misrepresentations as
Deceit or Negligence in 42 Harvard Law Review, 733
at 739 and 18 Virginia Law Review, 703 at 709. This
principle is approved as Section 552 (a) in the Restatement of Torts 2d, Tentative Drafts 11 and 12,
available at the University of Utah Law Library. See
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5 Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition,

Section

1512; 23 Am. J ur., Fraud § 80.
In Elder v. Clawson, H Utah 2d 379, 383, 384 P.2d
802, this Court upheld a judgment of rescission of a
contract of sale of land for fraud. The representation
was that the land was valuable for farming. The farm
had been shown to the plaintiff in which certain noxious
weeds were pointed out with a statement that they
ought to be sprayed and that cattle should be brought
on the premises to feed, but nothing was said about
quarantine of the farm because of the weed and its
effect on economic operation of the property.
In Stuck v. Delta Land & 1¥ater Company, plaintiff was shown a farm by the owner's agent and noticed
white material on the surface and asked if it was alkali
and was told it was gypsum and not deleterious. It was
argued by the defendant that plaintiff had no right
to rely on such representations when the presence of
alkali was so wide spread and well known, but the Court
held that the action lay on the basis of either knowing
falsity or negligent misrepresentation and plaintiff was
entitled to rely.
That Brunswick made the statement recklessly,
and close to wilfully, does not defeat the cause of action
based on negligent misrepresentation as found by the
Court according to Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279 at
283, 373 p .2d 382.
A principle similar to the rule of last clear chance
is evident in 23 Am. J ur., Fraud and Deceit. § 80. This
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is that knowledge by the representor that the other
party to the contemplated transaction is acting under
a mistaken belief as to certain facts is a factor in determining that a duty of disclosure is owing. If two parties
are negligent but one becomes aware of the fact that
the other does not know of his negligence, the one who
is so aware had a duty to act. So here, Brunswick could
not avoid being aware that Jardine was relying on the
statements of Dinius, Tracy and Dobbs, and accepting
Charlesworth as a person financially able to perform
and able to carry out his contracts. Charlesworth 's
original approach to Brunswick seeking financial assistance should have warned Brunswick that Charlesworth
did not have his own financial backing. And Charlesworth confided in Dinius that things were not going
well at l-Iill Field, seeking the help of Dinius to get
money from Jardine (R. 249, 293). This matter also
was discussed by Charlesworth and Tracy (R. 294).
\\Then it became apparent at the meeting at the Indigo
Cafe that .T ardine was accepting the urgings of Charlesworth and Dinius, Dinius had a duty to speak because
he then was compelled to realize that Jardine was not
aware of Charlesworth's financial inability, and Brunswick and its agents were. This was true again when the
$23,000.00 was advanced.
In this case, if the only statements made by the
defendant had been the statements introducing Charlesworth, it is reasonable to assume that the questions which
came to the plaintiff's mind thereafter would have put
him on inquiry had it not been for the fact that he
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was in constant touch with the Brunswick people who
continued to encourage him in accepting Charlesworth
as financially responsible, the Brunswick builder, the
expert in Brunswick construction, a person whom
Bruns;vick would finance if need be and one with whom
Brunswick was constantly working in order to get
plaintiff's building constructed even though it involved
requiring advances from plaintiff's funds. Brunswick
was on hand to answer plaintiff's questions, which were
always answered in accordance with the misrepresentations.
Plaintiff's questions would have led to discovery
of Charlesworth's true condition had not Brunswick's
agents kept him away from inquiring independently.
Thus, these misrepresentations were kept alive and
plaintiff continued to rely as defendant wished. Plaintiff acted reasonably and not negligently.
POINT Ill. PLAIN1 1IFJ11 IS NOT BARRED

BY ANY RELEASE E.LYECUTED IN THE
CONESCO ACTION.

Appellant doesn't seriously argue this point - it
rather throws the point in as a suggestion for the Court
to look into in the hope that something will come of it.
For instance, three sections from the title Guaranty
from 24 Am. J ur. are quoted at Pages 29 and 30 without any argument tending to establish a guaranty relationship. In fact, Section 7 states that representations
such as the plaintiff charges the defendant with in this
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case "may not be relied on to establish contractual relations" and that many such recommendations are made
"without intending to become guarantors of the persons
recommended." And then Section 87 refers to discharge
of the principal debtor as releasing the guarantor, without any attempt to show that Charlesworth is principal
debtor and Brm1s,vick Corporation is guarantor.
Then Appellant says the judgment in this case
makes Brunswick a co-obligor of Charlesworth with
no analysis of the relationship of the three parties and
after Brunswick became a co-obligor (by the judgment) there has been no release.
And finally, Appellant quotes from Utah's Uniform Joint Obligation Act and doesn't even refer to
the applicable definition. Section 15-4-1, after the few
words quoted by Appellant at Page 30 of its Brief,
states that " 'several obligors' means obligors severally
bound for the same performance."
Here, the performance Charlesworth owed to the
plaintiff was a contractual one to construct and lease
a building. The performance owed to the plaintiff by
Brunswick Corporation was not to mislead him and
the obligation found by the trial court to exist is one
for tortious misrepresentation. The authorities we have
examined refer to joint obligors or several obligors with
reference to a contract or several contracts common
to the parties; and joint obligors or co-obligors in the
tort field refer to obligors both of whom have been
engaged in related tortious conduct. We find no case,
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except Appellant's argument, where it is suggested
that where one party is bound by contract and the other
has committed a tort, the fad that both are involved
with one party claiming separate performances makes
them several obligors or co-obligors.
A group of cases having some analogous value are
found in 40 A.L.R. 2d 1075 and llansen v. Collett,
79 Nev. 159, 380 P. 2d 301 ( 1963). The question is:
where a person suffers personal injury because of the
negligence of another, and in treating those injuries
a physician or some other person is guilty of negligence
or malpractice, and the person causing the initial injury
is released in writing, is the person involved in negligent
treatment of those injuries also released? According
to the annotation, the authorities are divided and Nevada chooses to follow what it considers the minority
but better-reasoned view, that there is no release of
the second person unless that was intended by the release and the plaintiff was fully compensated for all
injuries by the first release. Hansen v. Collett, supra,
takes this holding, noting that the torts arc neither joint
nor concurring: "They were distinct, separate and independent. * * * Plaintiff settled with Hatch alone. * * *
No double recovery would follow." If the release of
a joint tort feasor is so circumscribed, then a fortiori
the release of a person under contractual liability would
have no effect to release the tort liability of a third
party even though the tortious conduct and the contract
were related to the same building. And Nevada reached
this result even though its joint obligations statute
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omits the reference to joint obligors being involved in
"the same performance." Nevada Revised Statutes,
Section 101.010.
J1'rieders v. Krier, 180 Wis. 430, 193 N.,V. 77,
31 A.L.R. ll8, is a case where a release was given and
the action involved a contract an<l a tort. Frieders was
injured while employed by his uncle. The uncle agreed
to leave his money in his will if he would make no
trouble because of the injury. Then Travelers Insurance made \Vorkmen's Compensation payments and
obtained a release of itself and the uncle. The uncle
died intestate and Frieders sued the estate on his contract. The court held the release from tort liability was
not a release of the contract liability.

See also Bank of Verona v. Stewart, 223, \Vis.
577, ~70 N.YV. 534 at 536; 76 C.J.S., ReleMe, § 48,
p. 678.
CONCLUSION
The :Memorandum Decision of the trial court analyzed the facts and the law applicable on defendant's
motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case and
denied the motion. This was not error. The evidence
and the inferences therefrom support the ruling and
the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard L. Bird, Jr.
for Richards, Bird and Hart
Attorneys at Law
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